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In rational choice theory, individuals are 
assumed always to choose the option that will 
provide them maximum utility. But actual 
choices must be based on subjective perceptions 
of the attributes of the available options, and the 
accuracy of these perceptions will always be 
limited by the information-processing capacity 
of one’s nervous system.
In recent work (Woodford 2011), I propose a 
theory of valuation errors under the hypothesis 
that perceptions are as accurate as possible on 
average, given the statistical properties of the 
environment to which they are adapted, subject 
to a limit on processing capacity. The capacity 
limit requires that choice be based on a com-
pressed representation of the choice situation; 
the data compression inevitably introduces dis-
tortions, but the resulting behavioral biases are 
actually efficient, when one takes account of the 
information-processing constraint. The theory is 
related to the “rational inattention” hypothesis 
of Sims (2003) but modified for closer confor-
mity with psychophysical and neurobiological 
evidence regarding perceptual accuracy.
This hypothesis can explain a variety of anom-
alous aspects of economic choice in experimen-
tal settings. Here I discuss the explanation that 
it provides for choices over lotteries of the kind 
captured by the prospect theory of Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979).
Attention And ChoiCe ‡
Prospect Theory as Efficient Perceptual Distortion†
By Michael Woodford*
‡Discussant: Daniel Kahneman, Princeton University.
* Columbia University, 420 W. 118th St., New York, NY 
10027 (e-mail: mw2230@columbia.edu). Thanks to Dmitriy 
Sergeyev for research assistance; to Tom Cunningham, 
Daniel Kahneman, David Laibson, and Andrei Shleifer for 
insightful comments; and to INET for research support.
† To view additional materials, visit the article page at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.41.
I. Errors in Visual Perception
To explain my hypothesis, it is useful to first 
consider the case of visual perception, where the 
mapping between objective characteristics and 
subjective perceptions has been studied much 
more thoroughly. I then conjecture that the same 
kind of information-processing constraint may 
be relevant for perceptions of economic value.
Let us consider in particular the relation 
between the objective luminance of an object 
in one’s field of vision (i.e., the amount of light 
actually reflected to the eye from it) and the sub-
jective perception of its brightness. Experiments 
in psychophysics and in neurobiology have 
established a number of key points.1 (i) The 
ability to discriminate between stimuli of dif-
fering brightness is both imprecise and proba-
bilistic: as the difference in luminance between 
two stimuli increases, the probability of a cor-
rect assessment of which is brighter increases 
continuously. (ii) Perceived brightness depends 
on the contrast between an object’s luminance 
and the background level of luminance to which 
the eye has adapted, rather than on the object’s 
absolute level of luminance. (iii) Finer discrimi-
nations are possible among degrees of contrast 
in the range that occur most frequently in the 
environment to which the eye has adapted.
The theory proposed in Woodford (2011) 
would explain these features of vision as fol-
lows. Suppose that a visual system adapts to pro-
cess perceptions of brightness in an environment 
in which the objective level of log luminance is 
distributed according to some continuous dis-
tribution. Let visual processing be described by 
conditional probabilities p(r | x) of a subjective 
1 See, e.g., Glimcher (2011, ch. 12); Kandel, Schwartz, 
and Jessell (2000, ch. 21); and additional references dis-
cussed in Woodford (2011). 
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perception of brightness r in the case of objec-
tive log luminance x.2 The degree of distortion 
of subjective perceptions can be measured by 
the mean squared error (MSE) of the optimal 
estimate   x(r) of log luminance based on the sub-
jective perception r. (Both the optimal estimate 
and the calculation of MSE depend, of course, 
on the distribution of levels of luminance to 
which the system is adapted.)
The efficient processing hypothesis then pro-
poses that the probabilities p(r | x) are chosen so 
as to minimize MSE, subject to an upper bound 
on the capacity C required for a communication 
channel to be able to transmit a signal about x 
that suffices to allow subjective representations 
r to be generated with the desired probabilities. 
The required capacity is defined using informa-
tion theory (Cover and Thomas 2006) as
 C =      max π E π [log  p(r | x) _p(r)  ],
where π is a prior over the frequency of occur-
rence of objective states x, and p(r) is the implied 
unconditional frequency distribution for subjec-
tive representations r. Note that C depends only 
on the conditional probabilities p(r | x) and can 
be defined under arbitrary assumptions about the 
nature of subjective representations.
In Woodford (2011), I discuss the optimal 
information structure in the case that log lumi-
nance in the environment is distributed accord-
ing to some Gaussian distribution N(μ,  σ 2 ). It is 
found to involve only a finite number of possible 
subjective perceptions r, even though there are 
a continuum of values for objective luminance. 
Each of these subjective perceptions r occurs 
with positive probability for all objective states 
x; thus perception is imprecise and stochastic. 
The probability that a stimulus with x = μ + zσ 
will be perceived to be brighter than one with 
x = μ is a continuously increasing, sigmoid 
function of z, equal to 0.5 when z = 0, as with 
experimental “psychometric functions.”
The theory also predicts that for a given value 
of C, the probability of a given subjective percep-
tion of brightness r is a function of the  normalized 
2 For simplicity, I here consider only perception of the 
brightness of a single, isolated light source, to make the 
problem unidimensional. 
level of log luminance, z ≡ (x − μ)/σ, that is 
invariant under changes in μ and σ. This implies 
that when one shifts to an environment with a 
different mean luminance, the levels of objective 
luminance that are considered to be “bright” or 
“dark” shift. In fact, perceived brightness should 
depend only on contrast z, rather than on x. And 
because only a finite number of distinct subjec-
tive perceptions are possible, it is efficient for 
subjective perceptions to vary substantially with 
changes in z only for values of z in an interval 
around zero; only  frequently occurring contrasts 
should be discriminated very well.
II. A Theory of Inattentive Valuation
I now propose a similar theory of efficient 
perceptual distortions in the context of estima-
tion of the values of options faced by an eco-
nomic decision maker (DM). Let each option 
be characterized by a value  x a for each of sev-
eral distinct attributes, indexed by a, and sup-
pose that the true utility value of option x is 
given by u =  ∑ a    x a . Suppose furthermore that 
each attribute must be perceived separately: 
there is a subjective perception  r a for each attri-
bute a, occurring with conditional probabili-
ties  p a ( r a |  x a ), conditionally independent across 
attributes. My hypothesis is then that these 
conditional distributions minimize the MSE of 
the optimal subjective estimate   u based on the 
vector of subjective representations, subject to 
an upper bound on the total required processing 
capacity C ≡  ∑ a    C a .
Let us consider the solution to this problem in 
the case that the prior distribution for the vector 
of attributes (with respect to which the perceptual 
system is optimized) is given by an independent 
Gaussian distribution N( μ a ,  σ a 2) for each attri-
bute. Then for each attribute a, the probabilities 
p a ( r a |  x a ) solve exactly the same mathematical 
problem as in the discussion of vision, for some 
capacity constraint  C a . In addition, the capacity 
C a allocated to the perception of each attribute 
is chosen so as to imply a Lagrange multiplier θ on the capacity constraint that is the same for 
each attribute. The optimal  C a for any attribute 
can be shown to be a monotonically increasing 
function of  σ a 2/θ, where the value of θ depends (inversely) upon the available total capacity C.
This implies that perceptions of value will be 
intrinsically stochastic, but that the degree of 
noise in subjective perceptions (relative to the 
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range of variation in the true values) will be less 
in the case of attributes with larger values of  σ a , 
which is to say, attributes responsible for a larger 
share of the variation in true utility u under the 
prior. Hence some attributes will be perceived 
more accurately than others; for a low enough 
share of the variation ( σ a 2 < 0.75θ), it is efficient 
to completely ignore the attribute in question.
For any given capacity  C a > 0, the (finite) 
number of distinct gradations of perceived value 
that will be discriminated is independent of the 
parameters of the prior distribution, and the 
probability of any given subjective perception  r a 
will depend only on the normalized value of the 
attribute,  z a ≡ ( x a −  μ a )/ σ a , rather than on the 
absolute value  x a of that attribute. A given sub-
jective perception  r a will correspondingly imply 
a particular estimate   za of the normalized value; 
the option chosen should then be the one with 
the highest value of  ∑ a    σ a   za ( r a ). Moreover, 
because it is efficient for subjective perceptions 
to vary substantially with changes in  z a only for 
values of  z a in an interval around zero, the mean 
normalized subjective value E[  za ] will be a sig-
moid function of the true normalized value  z a , 
with a slope that is greatest at  z a = 0.3
Such a theory can account for a number of 
seemingly anomalous features of observed 
choice behavior (Woodford 2011). Because 
the subjective perception of value is stochastic, 
choice is predicted to be intrinsically stochastic, 
as has long been observed in experiments, even 
in the absence of any random variations in util-
ity (of the kind used, for example, by McFadden 
1974 to explain stochastic choice).
The theory can account for “focusing illu-
sions,” in which choice gives disproportionate 
weight to a few particularly important features 
of the available options, while discounting (or 
wholly ignoring) a large number of other fea-
tures, each individually of minor significance 
for utility, but that would cumulatively matter a 
great deal if more accurately weighed (K ˝   oszegi 
and Szeidl 2011). And it can account for the exis-
tence of context effects, such as “decoy effects,” 
in which addition of another good to the choice 
set can increase demand for one of the previously 
available goods (Heath and Chatterjee 1995), if 
3 Two examples of this sigmoid function are shown in 
Figure 1, where however E[  za ] is plotted as a function of  x a 
rather than as a function of  z a .
the distribution of attribute values to which the 
perceptual system is adapted is determined by the 
distribution of attribute values over the options 
in the choice set. Here, however, I focus on the 
explanation that the theory provides for refer-
ence-dependent valuations of economic choices.
III. Reference-Dependent Choice
The model just sketched implies that subjec-
tive valuations will depend not only on goods’ 
objective attributes, but also on where the objec-
tive value falls within the distribution of antici-
pated possibilities. Thus, perceptions of value 
are relative, leading to “reference dependence” 
of the kind stressed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
For example, Kahneman and Tversky present 
different groups of experimental subjects with 
the following two choices:
•   Problem  1: In addition to whatever you 
own, you have been given 1,000. You are now 
asked to choose between (a) winning an addi-
tional 500 with certainty, or (b) a gamble with 
a 50 percent chance of winning 1,000 and a 50 
percent chance of winning nothing.
•   Problem  2: In addition to whatever you 
own, you have been given 2,000. You are now 
asked to choose between (a) losing 500 with 
certainty, and (b) a gamble with a 50 per-
cent chance of losing 1,000 and a 50 percent 
chance of losing nothing.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
  = 1000
  = 2000
Figure 1. Mean Normalized Subjective Value for 
Lotteries in Two Choice Problems
Notes: Solid dots: MNSV of a single outcome; open dots: 
MNSV of a lottery. Black line: initially given 1,000; gray 
line: initially given 2,000.
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They report that substantial majorities of their 
subjects choose the sure thing in Problem 1, and 
the gamble in Problem 2. Yet in each of the two 
problems, the choice is between identical prob-
ability distributions over possible final wealth 
states; thus the evaluation of these options is 
evidently not merely a function of the prob-
abilities assigned to different final wealth states. 
Kahneman and Tversky propose instead that in 
each problem, the different possible final wealths 
are evaluated relative to a “ reference point” cor-
responding to the wealth possessed prior to the 
decision; it is the fact that the  reference point is 
higher by 1,000 in Problem 2 that results in a 
different evaluation of the relative attractiveness 
of the two lotteries.
The theory of inattentive valuation proposed 
here provides an explanation for such find-
ings that remains a variant of rational choice 
theory, and that still includes the standard (von 
Neumann-Morgenstern) theory of choice over 
lotteries as a limiting case (the case in which the 
processing capacity allocated to the evaluation 
of one’s options is large enough). Suppose that 
we treat each of the possible outcomes for a lot-
tery as separate attributes that must be evaluated. 
In the above example, we may suppose that each 
option has two attributes: (1,500, 1,500) for 
option (a) and (1,000, 2,000) for option (b).
According to the theory presented above, the 
conditional distribution p( r s |  x s ) over subjective 
representations in the case of a given objective 
final wealth  x s in state s is adapted to a particular 
distribution of possible final wealths associated 
with choice situations of that kind. The distri-
bution to which the DM’s perceptions of value 
are adapted may well be different in situations 
like Problem 1 than in situations like Problem 2; 
hence the subjective perceptions of options (a) 
and (b) may be different in the two problems, 
even though the probability distributions over 
final wealth in the two options are the same.
For example, suppose that the DM recognizes 
the class of choice situations in which “you have 
been given 1,000 and now are asked to choose 
between lotteries” as different from the class of 
situations in which “you have been given 2,000 
and now are asked to choose between lotteries,” 
and so perceives the options presented using 
a perceptual system that has been optimally 
adapted to different distributions of potential 
outcomes in the two cases. If the DM has no rea-
son to expect the types of gains and losses that 
may be offered by the lotteries to depend on her 
wealth at the time that the choice is presented, 
then the prior distribution over possible levels of 
final wealth should indeed be different between 
the two classes of situations: the entire probabil-
ity distribution should be shifted up by 1,000 in 
the case of the second class.
For example, if the distribution of possible net 
gains from a lottery payoff in either state of the 
world is assumed to be a Gaussian distribution 
N(0, 1,00 0 2 ), then for either state of the world, 
in both classes of choice situations the prior 
distribution over possible final wealths should 
be a Gaussian distribution N(μ, 1,00 0 2 ), but μ 
should be higher by 1,000 for the second class. 
Since the standard deviation is the same for both 
classes of situations, if they are also expected 
to occur with equal frequency (so that the DM 
cares equally about accurate evaluations of 
options in the two cases), it will be optimal for 
the same processing capacity C to be allocated 
to perceptions of the value of outcomes in each 
of the two cases. Then if the optimal informa-
tion structure for situations in class 1 involves 
conditional probabilities {  p 1 ( r s |  x s )}, the optimal 
information structure for situations in class 2 
will involve conditional probabilities {  p 2 ( r s |  x s )} 
defined over the same domain, where
  p 2 ( r s |  x s ) =  p 1 ( r s |  x s − 1,000)
for each subjective perception  r s and each pos-
sible final wealth level  x s .
Reversals of the preference ordering of the 
kind reported by Kahneman and Tversky can 
easily be explained by reference-dependence of 
this sort in the way that subjective perceptions of 
value are coded. As an example, Figure 1 shows 
the mean normalized subjective value (MNSV) 
assigned to each lottery in each of the two 
choice situations just discussed, if the process-
ing capacity allocated to the perception of the 
value of outcomes in each class of situations is 
one-half a binary digit. Here the horizontal axis 
x indicates the amount by which the DM’s final 
wealth exceeds initial wealth, and the vertical 
axis plots   z, the DM’s estimate of the normal-
ized value. Each of the two sigmoid curves plots 
the function E[  z | x] for one of the two classes of 
choice situations: the black curve for class 1 (the 
prior with μ = 1,000) and the gray curve for 
class 2 (the prior with μ = 2,000). The lottery 
with the higher MNSV in any choice situation 
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is the one that should on average be preferred (though actual choice will be noisy, owing to the 
stochasticity of subjective perception).
In the case of option (a), which results in 
x = 1,500 with certainty, the MNSV is given 
by the solid dot above x = 1,500 on the curve 
corresponding to the given choice situation. In 
the case of option (b), the MNSV for one state 
will be given by the solid dot above x = 1,000 
on the appropriate curve, while the MNSV 
for the other state will be given by the black 
dot above x = 2,000 on that same curve. The 
overall MNSV for option (b), averaging the 
MNSVs for the two equiprobable states, will 
then be given by the open dot above x = 1,500, 
the midpoint of the dashed line connecting the 
two black dots representing the MNSVs for the 
individual states. The figure clearly shows that 
in this numerical example, option (a) should be 
preferred on average to option (b) in Problem 1 (the solid dot is higher than the open dot), 
while option (b) should be preferred on aver-
age to option (a) in Problem 2 (the open dot is 
higher than the solid dot, in this case). Hence the 
experimental results of Kahneman and Tversky 
are quite consistent with this model of valuation.
The theory predicts not only reference-
dependent valuations, but also the coexistence 
of apparent risk-aversion in the domain of 
gains with apparently risk-seeking behavior in 
the domain of losses. This is because efficient 
 coding of perceptions of value involves dimin-
ishing sensitivity to further changes in value that 
are either well above or well below the levels 
that are expected to be encountered most often. 
The formal structure of the theory is similar to 
that of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979), but a theoretical derivation is given here 
for the shape of the nonlinear “value function” 
postulated there. The present theory also clari-
fies that the “reference point” (μ above) should 
in general be determined not by the status quo, 
but by the mean outcome that is expected in a 
given class of situations.
IV. Conclusion
Reference-dependent choice of the kind cap-
tured by prospect theory may be understood, 
then, as an efficient approach to choice by a 
DM with limited information-processing capac-
ity. The theory provides an explanation for why 
biases of this kind in choice behavior should be 
so commonly observed, especially in experimen-
tal settings where the stakes for subjects may not 
be large enough to justify paying close attention. 
At the same time, it predicts that choices should 
conform more closely to standard theory in situ-
ations where the allocation of more processing 
capacity to the evaluation of options yields a suf-
ficient benefit.
An important topic for further analysis is 
the determination of the prior distribution with 
respect to which the DM’s perceptual system 
should be optimized in a given situation. In 
the example above, if situations in class 1 and 
class 2 were not distinguished (with a differ-
ent expected distribution of possible outcomes 
for each class), there could be no difference in 
the “reference point” for the two cases. At the 
same time, if the DM’s perceptual system were 
adapted to a different distribution for each of the 
options “(a) in situation 1,” “(b) in situation 1,” 
and so on, then—because the distributions of 
possible outcomes for “(a) in situation 1” and 
“(a) in situation 2” are the same—there would 
again be no difference in the MNSV for option (a) in situation 1 as opposed to situation 2, and 
similarly for option (b).
Hence the kind of reference-dependence 
observed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
can be explained only under the hypothesis that 
different levels of wealth achieved prior to the 
choice trigger the use of different perceptual 
codes, while the evaluation of different options 
within a given “choice situation” does not.4 
Presumably the fact that the method of percep-
tual coding takes account of some, but not all, 
aspects of the DM’s situation should itself be 
explained as a way of economizing on informa-
tion-processing capacity; but such an inquiry is 
left for future work.
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